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INTRODUCTION 
It is the nature of laws and rights to periodically collide, and gun control 
and gun ownership are no exception. Every state in the Union has gun 
control laws,1 and mayors of cities across the United States rely on the 
 
† Executive Editor, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Volume 161. J.D. Candidate, 2013, 
University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2006, Amherst College. I thank Professor Sophia 
Z. Lee, for her guidance and encouragement throughout this project; Jaclyn Simon, Ethan 
Simonowitz, and everyone on the Law Review for being wonderful colleagues and exemplary 
editors; my family, for their eternal support; and Janine, for being always by my side. All errors 
are my own. 
1 BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
ATF PUB. 5300.5, STATE LAWS AND PUBLISHED ORDINANCES—FIREARMS (29th ed. 
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ability to impose limitations on gun ownership to maintain public safety.2 
At the same time, a majority of Americans believes that the Second 
Amendment to the Constitution3 protects an individual right to own guns.4 
So when the Supreme Court was asked, first in 2008 and again in 2010, to 
define the scope of the Second Amendment, it confronted an issue of 
frequent cultural and political clash.5 In District of Columbia v. Heller, the 
Court, interpreting the Second Amendment essentially for the first time, 
concluded that it protects an individual right to gun ownership.6 Two 
years later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court applied the newly 
defined Second Amendment to the states.7 Both cases ignited significant 
public and scholarly debate.8 Between the two, over one hundred amicus 
briefs were filed with the Court.9 Scholars’ reactions to the rulings ranged 
widely from praise for the Court’s originalism, to concern about questions 
left unanswered, to charges of judicial activism.  
Yet it was not entirely clear what the Court accomplished with Heller 
and McDonald. Some suggested that the holdings portended a general 
hostility to the enterprise of gun control. Because the Court arguably left 
open certain key questions—such as a standard of review—scholars 
wondered whether lower courts armed with Heller and McDonald would 
invalidate gun control laws at will.  
 
2008) [hereinafter ATF REPORT], available at http://www.atf.gov/publications/download/p/ 
atf-p-5300-5/atf-p-5300-5.pdf. 
2 See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text. 
3 The Second Amendment provides, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security 
of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. II. 
4 See Guns, POLLINGREPORT.COM, http://www.pollingreport.com/guns2.htm (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2011) (listing CNN/Opinion Research Corporation poll data from June 2008 in which 
67% of respondents indicated the belief that the Second Amendment guarantees each person the 
right to own a gun).  
5 See Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 191, 201-36 (2008) (chronicling the history of the “culture wars” over gun control 
and the meaning of the Second Amendment).  
6 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008); see also id. at 625 (calling the question “long judicially unre-
solved”). 
7 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010). 
8 See infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text. 
9 See DC v. Heller, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/dc-v-
heller (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (listing sixty-seven amicus briefs including that of the 
United States); McDonald v. City of Chicago, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
case-files/cases/mcdonald-v-city-of-chicago (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (listing fifty-one amicus 
briefs). 
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Professor Cass Sunstein took another view.10 Sunstein viewed the Heller 
Court as having issued a restrained, minimalist opinion.11 He argued that 
the Court’s approach in the case was narrow and represented merely the 
repudiation of a single law which “starkly departed” from the public under-
standing of the right to bear arms.12 As an empirical matter, Sunstein 
appears to have been correct. Three years after Heller, lower courts are not 
taking very many liberties with gun control laws, and very little has actually 
changed.13 Post-Heller gun control, in other words, looks a lot like pre-Heller 
gun control. 
I agree with Professor Sunstein that Heller was minimalist.14 However, 
this Comment is devoted to the question of why the Court ruled in the way 
that it did. Sunstein suggests that minimalist rulings like Heller are strategic 
insofar as they pave the way for future “doctrinal innovation” in that area of 
the law.15 A minimal Second Amendment holding now makes more palata-
ble a broader Second Amendment holding later. 
I do not necessarily disagree with this account of minimalism, but I 
think it is incomplete. Minimalism does not only facilitate doctrinal innova-
tion in a given area of the law. On my account, the Court sometimes issues 
minimalist rulings in order to preserve its ability to develop doctrine at all. 
The Court’s ability to “say what the law is”16 depends entirely on its 
institutional credibility—credibility that is risked when the Court rules on 
controversial topics. Thus, in certain “hot-button” cases, when the Court is 
 
10 Professor Sunstein is the Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and 
served from September 2009 to August 2012 as Administrator of the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs in the Obama Administration. See Cass R. Sunstein, HARVARD L. SCH., 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/index.html?id=552 (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). He 
has been called “the most remarkably thoughtful, constructive, and productive scholar of 
his . . . generation.” James E. Fleming, The Odyssey of Cass Sunstein, 43 TULSA L. REV. 843, 843 
(2008). When he was hired to join the Harvard Law School faculty, then-Dean Elena Kagan 
described Professor Sunstein as “‘the pre-eminent legal scholar of our time—the most wide-ranging, 
the most prolific, the most cited and the most influential.’” Michael Higgins, Harvard Hires U. of C. 
Law Professor Cass Sunstein, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 20, 2008), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2008-02-
20/news/0802190580_1_harvard-law-school-harvard-university-cass-sunstein.  
11 See Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller As Griswold, The Supreme 
Court, 2007 Term, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246, 260-71 (2008) (emphasizing the Court’s focus on the 
particular provisions at issue as well as its acknowledgment that the decision leaves much about 
the Second Amendment unresolved).  
12 Id. at 267. 
13 See infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text. 
14 McDonald was, too. Although Professor Sunstein’s paper was about Heller and did not 
address McDonald, I believe that his analysis applies equally well to both cases. Thus, for the 
purposes of this Comment, I often treat the two cases as jurisprudentially quite similar. 
15 Sunstein, supra note 11, at 264. 
16 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
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required to make a controversial legal determination, it does so on narrow 
grounds in order to preserve its institutional power. I call this approach 
“power-preserving minimalism.” Unpopular decisions can harm the Court’s 
authority when they result in resistance—that is, when the Court’s mandate 
goes unfollowed. Minimalist decisions avoid this pitfall: they state a legal 
principle in a way that requires fairly little (or no) action by the population 
at large. This Comment argues that Heller and McDonald were decided in 
just such a way. They were the subject of intense public debate and were 
quite significant jurisprudentially, but their innovative legal holdings were 
tempered by judicial tolerance of most existing gun laws. Thus, whether 
they agreed or not, it was difficult for citizens or political actors (federal, 
state, or local) to resist or defy the decisions in any way. By demanding 
fairly little, the decisions preserved the Supreme Court’s power.  
In displaying power-preservation tactics, Heller and McDonald are two in 
a line of cases that includes Marbury v. Madison,17 Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,18 and, most recently, National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius,19 the Court’s decision resolving the constitutionality of the Afford-
able Care Act. In all of these cases, the Court set new legal precedent but 
demanded very little in practical effect. And in all of these cases, a chief 
factor motivating the Court was the preservation of its own institutional 
power.  
An exploration of the forces that motivate the Supreme Court is not 
simply an academic endeavor; it bears on the core of the Court’s function in 
our constitutional democracy.20 The Court issues nationally authoritative 
interpretations of the Constitution and federal law, and these interpreta-
tions are binding on everyone, including government actors in the other co-
equal branches. Yet no part of the constitutional text or structure technically 
gives the Court this awesome power.21 The Court relies on the public’s, and 
 
17 Id. at 137. 
18 (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
19 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
20 At the outset of this project, I think that two clarifications are important. First, I often 
speak of power-preservation concerns as “motivating” the Court’s outcomes. I use “motivate” to 
mean, simply, “provide a motive for.” I do not presume to have uncovered the cause or reason, or 
even the singular motive for the rulings I discuss; I claim only to offer a motive. Second, the 
notion that the Court would take steps to preserve its institutional power should not be read to 
connote anything nefarious. On the contrary, the Court’s ability to protect its power is critical—
and, of course, antecedent—to the effective discharge of its more familiar roles in our constitu-
tional system. More importantly, although I argue at times that power-preservation concerns 
might affect the breadth or remedial aspects of a ruling, I do not suggest that power preservation 
ought to, or does, affect the resolution of specific legal issues.  
21 See infra notes 102-04 and accompanying text. 
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the other branches’, belief in and deference to the Court’s institutional role 
and competency.22 It thus falls to the Court to preserve that influence 
through its primary institutional function—to wit, deciding cases. Moreover, 
although this Comment explores power preservation primarily through two 
specific cases, the Court’s repeated attempts to preserve and conserve its 
power is a phenomenon the significance of which is only increasing.23 It was 
almost certainly at play in the recent landmark ruling upholding the Afford-
able Care Act.24 And, as will be discussed, it has emerged at many key 
moments throughout the history of the Supreme Court.  
 
22 See infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text. Thus, we might even think of the Court’s 
interpretative function as a (massive) “soft power.” See generally Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitu-
tion, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 721-22 (2012) (discussing soft power in the context of foreign affairs 
and interbranch conflict and noting that “the branches . . . compete publicly for the affections of 
the people[,]” while those that fail to do so risk “consistently losing power”). 
23 “[T]he court’s standing with the public has slipped significantly in the past quarter-
century,” so the Court’s power could indeed be waning. Adam Liptak & Allison Kopicki, Approval 
Rating for Justices Hits Just 44% in New Poll, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2012, at A1. 
24 See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2576-2609 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). Whether the Chief 
Justice’s opinion in Sebelius fits the model outlined in this Comment, see infra Section II.C, is left 
for another paper, but a strong argument could be made that it does.  
The case was of huge public significance. See Adam Liptak, In Health Act, Roberts Given Signa-
ture Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2012, at A1 (“The decision . . . will have practical consequences for 
tens of millions of Americans . . . .”). Public opinion was divided; the decision was bound to 
disappoint many on the losing side. Lydia Saad, Americans Issue Split Decision on Healthcare Ruling, 
GALLUP (June 29, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/155447/Americans-Issue-Split-Decision-
Healthcare-Ruling.aspx (reporting polling data showing that 46% of respondents supported the 
Supreme Court’s ruling, while 46% disagreed with the outcome). And in this unique case, any 
result—even a ruling for the government—carried a risk of resistance since much of the Act looks 
to state governments for implementation of the law’s reforms. Cf., e.g., Robert Pear, Republican 
Governor of Florida Says State Won’t Expand Medicaid, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2012, at A12 (discussing 
the resistance of certain states to aspects of the Affordable Care Act that require state-government 
cooperation). But see infra note 111. Thus, no matter the outcome, the Court risked creating a large, 
unhappy group with some ability to defy the ruling.  
Against that backdrop, the Chief Justice’s opinion was a masterclass in power preservation. 
He stated a novel legal principle, limiting the federal government’s power under the Commerce 
Clause, see Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2591-93, but he largely upheld the law. See id. at 2600, 2603-07 
(upholding the Act’s individual mandate but limiting the reach of the Act’s Medicaid expansion); 
see also Adam Liptak, Justices, By 5-4, Uphold Health Care Law; Roberts in Majority; Victory for 
Obama, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2012, at A1 (calling the ruling “a victory for Mr. Obama and 
Congressional Democrats”). Many have opined that power preservation was precisely what 
motivated the Chief Justice’s opinion. See, e.g., John Cassidy, John Roberts and Mitt Romney: Two 
Peas in a Pod, NEW YORKER (June 29, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/johncassidy/ 
2012/06/john-roberts-and-mitt-romney-two-peas-in-a-pod.html (arguing that the Chief Justice 
“preserved the Court’s good name . . . while simultaneously striking another blow against Wickard 
v. Filburn”); David L. Franklin, Why Did Roberts Do It?, SLATE (June 28, 2012, 3:51 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/06/john_roberts_broke_with_ 
conservatives_to_preserve_the_supreme_court_s_legitimacy.html (suggesting that “the court’s very 
legitimacy” was at stake and that Roberts ruled the way he did “to save the court”); Roger Parloff, 
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This Comment proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes Heller and 
McDonald and the scholarly reactions that followed them; it also develops 
Professor Sunstein’s position in some detail. Part II turns to a question that 
logically follows Professor Sunstein’s analysis: that of why courts issue 
minimalist rulings. It lays out three potential reasons, their theoretical 
underpinnings, and the characteristics that define opinions motivated by 
each. Part III shows how the last of the three approaches, power-preserving 
minimalism, has appeared in at least two other important cases in United 
States legal history. By analogy to the cases in Part III, Part IV posits that 
Heller and McDonald followed the same model. It points to the judicial and 
historical similarities and argues that those parallels indicate a shared 
motivation. The Comment concludes that its analysis is valuable for two 
reasons. First, the analytical framework applied to Heller and McDonald is 
useful beyond the instant cases and may help categorize other important 
minimalist rulings, including the Court’s historic ruling on the healthcare 
law. Second, concluding that the Court is at times concerned about its own 
influence takes appropriate account of the institutional importance of 
judicial supremacy in our divided system of government. 
I. HELLER AND MCDONALD: THEIR BARK AND THEIR BITE 
A. Heller v. District of Columbia 
Heller was a Second Amendment challenge to a Washington, D.C., law 
that imposed strict limits on gun ownership in the District of Columbia.25 
In his analysis of the case, Professor Sunstein describes the law at issue as 
 
In Defense of John Roberts, CNNMONEY (June 29, 2012, 6:01 AM), http://management. 
fortune.cnn.com/2012/06/29/in-defense-of-john-roberts (lauding the Chief Justice for tending to 
“the Court’s dwindling store of credibility”); Adam Winkler, The Roberts Court is Born, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2012, 12:01 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/the-roberts-court-is-
born (“Roberts may have voted to save health care because he wants to preserve the Court’s capital 
to take on other big issues heading toward the Court.”). 
With that said, it remains to be seen whether the Chief Justice was successful. The 2012-2013 
term should “clarify whether the health care ruling will come to be seen as the case that helped 
Chief Justice Roberts protect the authority of his court against charges of partisanship.” Adam 
Liptak, Justices Facing Weighty Rulings and New Dynamic, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2012, at A1. One 
early study has suggested that the healthcare ruling has actually hurt the Court’s reputation so far. 
See Andrea Campbell & Nathaniel Persily, The Health Care Case in the Public Mind: How the 
Supreme Court Shapes Opinion About Itself and the Laws It Considers, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE 
(forthcoming May 2013), available at http://blog.oup.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2012/09/Persily-Campbell-health-care-case-in-public-mind.pdf; see also Adam Liptak, Health 
Care Case Helped Law But Hurt Supreme Court, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2012, at A19 
(citing the aforementioned study). 
25 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 574-75 (2008).  
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“among the most draconian in the nation—a genuine national outlier.”26 It 
was especially restrictive of handguns: in the Court’s words, “[i]t [wa]s a 
crime to carry an unregistered firearm, and the registration of handguns 
[wa]s prohibited.”27  
In order to address the law’s validity, the Court found it necessary to 
answer the “long judicially unresolved” question of whether the Second 
Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms or rather a collective 
right to bear arms in connection with state militia service.28 That endeavor 
constituted the bulk of the majority opinion.29 The Court engaged in what 
Sunstein called “self-consciously originalist”30 analysis, consulting numerous 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century sources, including of-the-period dic-
tionaries,31 Blackstone’s Commentaries,32 and the Declaration of Independ-
ence.33  
The Court, with Justice Scalia writing for a 5–4 majority (over two 
vigorous dissents), concluded that the Second Amendment protects the 
individual right of “law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense 
of hearth and home” and invalidated the D.C. law.34 A blanket ban on 
handguns, the Court explained, “would fail constitutional muster” under 
any standard of scrutiny.35 (The Court did not apply—or set—any specific 
level of scrutiny.36) Nevertheless, the Court assured the District that the 
Constitution leaves it “a variety of tools for combating” gun violence.37 It 
stressed that its opinion should not be read “to cast doubt on longstanding 
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or 
laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places . . . or laws 
imposing conditions” on the sale of guns.38 This qualification limited the 
 
26 Sunstein, supra note 11, at 263; see also Heller, 554 U.S. at 629 (“Few laws in the history of 
our Nation have come close to the severe restriction of the District’s handgun ban.”). 
27 Heller, 554 U.S. at 574-75. 
28 Id. at 625. 
29 Fifty-four of sixty-two pages, to be exact. See id. at 575-629. 
30 Sunstein, supra note 11, at 246. The Court’s analysis was surely thorough, though I express 
no view as to its historical accuracy or persuasiveness.  
31 Heller, 554 U.S. at 582-84. 
32 Id. at 582. 
33 Id. at 586. 
34 Id. at 635. 
35 Id. at 628-29. 
36 Id. But see Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1224, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“Heller and McDonald leave little doubt that courts are to assess gun 
bans and regulations based on text, history, and tradition, not by a balancing test such as strict or 
intermediate scrutiny.”). 
37 Heller, 554 U.S. at 636. 
38 Id. at 626-27. 
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reach of the decision considerably. Thus, despite the new legal interpreta-
tion, lower courts have applied the decision narrowly.39  
B. McDonald v. City of Chicago 
McDonald v. City of Chicago came two years later and considered a  
challenge to two municipal gun control laws in Illinois brought under the 
Second and Fourteenth Amendments.40 The Court, this time with Justice 
Alito writing for the same five-Justice majority, held that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Second Amend-
ment against the states, and remanded the case for reconsideration by the 
Seventh Circuit.41 Although the Court declined to adjudge the specific 
municipal laws at issue, the writing was on the wall. The Court characterized 
the laws as similar to the ones in Heller, because they prohibited possession 
of an unregistered firearm and “prohibit[ed] registration of most handguns, 
thus effectively banning handgun possession.”42 Perhaps unsurprisingly, both 
municipal laws were promptly repealed.43 
As the first case to apply the Second Amendment to the states, McDonald 
was something of a watershed.44 Indeed, the Court had explicitly held 135 
years earlier, in United States v. Cruikshank, that the Second Amendment 
“has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national govern-
ment.”45 
 
39 See, e.g., United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047-50 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., 
concurring) (noting that Heller’s dictum emphasizing the case’s respect for “longstanding 
prohibitions” means that “[r]ather than seriously wrestling with how to apply this new Second 
Amendment rule, . . . courts will continue to simply reference the applicable Heller dictum and 
move on”). 
40 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010). 
41 Id. at 3050. The Court’s decision was based in part on its adoption of Heller’s historical 
analysis of the Second Amendment. See id. at 3036-42. 
42 Id. at 3026 (emphasis added). 
43 See NRA v. City of Chicago, 393 F. App’x 390, 390 (7th Cir. 2010) (remanding to the 
district court “with instructions to dismiss as moot” the case as a result of the ordinances’ repeal). 
44 Cf. NRA v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 857 (7th Cir. 2009) (“The Supreme Court has 
rebuffed requests to apply the second amendment to the states.”), rev’d sub nom. McDonald, 130 
S.Ct. 3020 (2010). 
45 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875); accord Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886). Interestingly, 
the McDonald Court declined to overrule Cruikshank officially. Four Justices from the majority 
reasoned that, because Cruikshank had been decided on Privileges or Immunities Clause grounds 
(in the wake of the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873)), it did not preclude the 
Court’s present incorporation analysis, which looks to the Due Process Clause. McDonald, 130 S. 
Ct. at 3030-31. Justice Thomas would have explicitly overruled Cruikshank. Id. at 3088 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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But as in Heller, the Court was mindful of the reach of its decision. Re-
sponding to the municipal respondents’ federalism argument that they 
ought to be free to regulate guns as they deem fit, the Court reiterated 
Heller’s protection of longstanding prohibitions on gun ownership.46 The 
opinion emphasized that the Court’s own holding “by no means eliminates[] 
[states’] ability to devise solutions to social problems that suit local needs 
and values.”47 “[I]ncorporation,” the Court insisted, “does not imperil every 
law regulating firearms.”48  
C. Scholarly Reactions 
Reactions to the decisions were numerous, passionate, and varied. Some 
commentators, assuming the mantle of Justice Stevens’s Heller dissent,49 
questioned Justice Scalia’s historical analysis.50 Others denounced the 
holding as “activist,”51 marked its status as “landmark,”52 and noted its high 
stakes, even in advance.53 One scholar even suggested in his article title, 
after Heller but before McDonald, that the latter “May Well Change the 
Constitutional World As We Know It.”54  
And then there was Professor Sunstein. Rejecting commentary that 
compared Heller to judicially ambitious cases in United States history (for 
example, Lochner v. New York55), Sunstein argues that “notwithstanding its 
apparent sweep, the Heller Court’s opinion had unmistakable minimalist 
 
46 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3046. 
47 Id. at 3046. 
48 Id. at 3047. 
49 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the history of the Second Amendment does not support the majority’s reading). 
50  See, e.g., Adam Winkler, The Secret History of Guns, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 2011, at 
80, 82 (arguing that Framing-era gun control laws were quite strict in that only certain citizens—a 
subset of men—were permitted, and in fact required, to own guns). 
51 J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. 
REV. 253, 264-65 (2009); see also William G. Merkel, Heller As Hubris, and How McDonald v. 
City of Chicago May Well Change the Constitutional World As We Know It, 50 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 1221, 1222 (2010) (“Heller changed the constitutional landscape boldly and significantly.”); 
Jeffrey M. Shaman, After Heller: What Now for the Second Amendment?, 50 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 1095, 1095 (2010) (“The Heller decision was a severe departure from precedent.”). 
52 Paul Duggan, Having Toppled D.C. Ban, Man Registers Revolver, WASH. POST, July 19, 
2008, at B1; Linda Greenhouse, Justices, Ruling 5–4, Endorse Personal Right to Own Gun, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 27, 2008, at A1. 
53 See Brannon P. Denning, In Defense of a “Thin” Second Amendment: Culture, the Constitution, 
and the Gun Control Debate, 1 ALBANY GOV’T L. REV. 419, 420 (2008) (writing before the 
decision and declaring the stakes of Heller to be “no less than the Court’s continued role as our 
interpreter-in-chief”). 
54 Merkel, supra note 51, at 1221 (article title). 
55 198 U.S. 45 (1905) 
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elements.”56 A useful point of comparison, Sunstein suggests, is Griswold v. 
Connecticut.57 In Griswold, the Court invalidated a Connecticut law banning 
the use of contraception on the grounds that the law intruded impermissibly 
on the privacy of the marital relationship.58 
First, Sunstein argues that both Griswold and Heller invalidated laws that 
were national outliers and in so doing “operated in accordance with a 
national consensus at the expense of a law that counted as a sharp deviation 
from it.”59 Second, in both cases the Court issued a narrow ruling. Just as 
Griswold addressed specifically “the right to use contraceptives within 
marriage,” Heller also set “clear limitations” and excepted many existing gun 
laws in dictum.60 Third, Sunstein suggests that the apparent boldness of 
ruling in favor of an individual right was tempered by the fact that a belief 
in the “individual right to use guns has become an entrenched part of 
American culture.”61 Reasonable people disagree as to the role national 
consensus should play in constitutional law,62 but, as a “tiebreaker[],” 
Sunstein argues that national consensus may be—and has been—
appropriately considered.63 Just as popular notions of marital privacy 
weighed heavily against the Court’s sustaining the law in Griswold, it would 
have been “no light thing for the Supreme Court to announce that tens of 
millions of Americans are simply mistaken” about their right to bear arms.64  
Arguably, Sunstein’s analysis applies with equal force to McDonald. The 
Court there did not even rule on the constitutionality of the municipal gun 
laws being challenged; rather, it held the Second Amendment to be incor-
porated against the states and remanded the challenge to the lower court.65 
 
56 Sunstein, supra note 11, at 267. 
57 Id. at 260; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).  
58 381 U.S. at 485-86. 
59 Sunstein, supra note 11, at 263-64. 
60 Id. at 267 (emphasis added); see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 
(2008) (“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibi-
tions . . . .”). 
61 Sunstein, supra note 11, at 270. 
62 See id. at 269. Indeed, one might argue that the Court should have looked not to the popu-
lar will, but to the lower federal courts’ longstanding reading of the Amendment. Id. Or one could 
argue that the law should have been sustained because, “for Thayerian reasons, the democratic 
process should be given room to maneuver, at least in the face of reasonable doubt.” Id. at 270; see 
also James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. 
L. REV. 129, 144 (1893).  
63 Sunstein, supra note 11, at 269-70. 
64 Id. at 270. 
65 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010). 
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More to the point, the Court reiterated Heller’s proviso that certain 
“longstanding” limitations on gun possession were not in jeopardy.66 
Professor Sunstein also briefly explores the strategic motivations behind 
Heller, suggesting that it may have provided a starting point for a larger 
doctrinal shift. “[I]f the Court . . . is initiating a new avenue for potential 
invalidations,” he says, “it is likely to begin narrowly,” as Griswold did in 
paving the way for later decisions such as Roe v. Wade.67 Sunstein notes that 
if his analogy to Griswold holds, Heller may serve as a starting point for 
“doctrinal innovation.”68 
That doctrinal innovation has yet to materialize. The advent of a new 
legal right has spurred increased litigation,69 but three years after Heller, 
very few laws have been invalidated70 in part because no agreed-upon 
standard of review has emerged.71 Indeed, commentators have noted that 
“the only consistency in the lower court cases is in the results. Regardless of 
the test used, challenged gun laws almost always survive.”72 Sunstein’s 
prediction that only the most draconian gun laws would fall in Heller’s wake 
appears to have been correct, and some believe that “this is precisely what 
the Supreme Court wanted.”73 If so, then the question is: why? 
 
66 Id. at 3047. 
67 Sunstein, supra note 11, at 264. 
68 Id. 
69 See Stephen Kiehl, In Search of a Standard: Gun Regulations After Heller and McDonald, 70 
MD. L. REV. 1131, 1141 (2011) (“Hundreds of challenges to gun regulations have been filed in the 
wake of Heller and McDonald . . . .”); Adam Winkler, The More the Second Amendment Changes . . ., 
PRAWFSBLAWG, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2010/06/index.html (June 28, 2010, 
5:38 PM) (reporting “approximately two hundred” federal lawsuits challenging gun control laws 
since Heller). 
70 Kiehl, supra note 69, at 1141-42. 
71 Id. at 1141; see also McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3115 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (expressing concern 
that the decision forces federal courts to evaluate gun policy “under a standard of review we have 
not even established”). 
72 TINA MEHR & ADAM WINKLER, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y, ISSUE BRIEF: THE 
STANDARDLESS SECOND AMENDMENT 0 (2010), available at http://www.acslaw.org/sites/ 
default/files/Mehr_and_Winkler_Standardless_Second_Amendment.pdf. One recent exception comes 
from a federal court in the District of Maryland. In Woollard v. Sheridan, the court addressed 
whether the Second Amendment protects gun ownership beyond the home, which the court 
acknowledged was “left unanswered in Heller.” No. 10-2068, 2012 WL 695674, at *3 (D. Md. Mar. 
2, 2012). The court concluded that there was at least some protection for gun ownership outside 
the home because it determined, inter alia, that the same factors that drove the Heller decision—
self-defense and the (conditional) right to a weapon in a confrontation—were present, if to a lesser 
degree, in certain situations beyond the home. Id. at *5-7. 
73 E.g., Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Heller, High Water(mark)? Lower Courts 
and the New Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1259 (2009). 
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II. WHY MINIMALISM? THREE THEORIES 
Professor Sunstein’s account of Heller briefly touches upon one reason 
courts exercise judicial minimalism when faced with issues of national 
interest: they want to provide a starting point for doctrinal shifts. But that 
is not the only motivation for minimalism. In addition to doctrinal shifts, 
this Section explores two other forces that might lead courts to minimalist 
rulings. First, there is the argument that courts simply ought to exercise 
restraint as a matter of democratic principle. Second, as Sunstein mentions, 
courts might use minimalism to set up future doctrinal shifts. Finally, 
courts use minimalism as a way to preserve power when forced to make 
controversial or potentially unpopular decisions. 
A consideration of the range of factors that motivate courts to engage in 
minimalism is not merely an academic exercise. The inquiry exposes the 
varying impacts of minimalist rulings on the law and the role of the Court 
vis-à-vis its coordinate branches more broadly. This, in turn, allows for a 
more complete understanding of what the Court was trying to do in Heller 
and McDonald. And if this framework adequately categorizes minimalist 
rulings beyond the two addressed herein, it may provide a guide for catego-
rizing other cases. 
A. Mandatory Minimalism 
Many theorists argue that judges must defer to the political will of the 
democratic branches except in the most egregious scenarios. Let us call this 
mandatory minimalism. A normative version of this view is perhaps best 
associated with Justice Felix Frankfurter,74 whose dissent in West Virginia 
State Board of Education v. Barnette75 was a paean to judicial minimalism and 
democratic values. In Barnette, the Court invalidated on First Amendment 
grounds West Virginia’s requirement that all students recite the Pledge of 
Allegiance each morning at school.76 Admonishing the Court for its ambi-
tion, Justice Frankfurter wrote that judges are “not justified in writing 
[their] private notions of policy into the Constitution” and that their “own 
opinion[s] about the wisdom or evil of a law should be excluded altogether” 
 
74 See NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S 
GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 105 (2010) (relating that Frankfurter, before he was a 
Justice and in response to the Lochner era cases, led the development of a constitutional philosophy 
“based on the principle of judicial restraint”); see also MICHAEL E. PARRISH, FELIX FRANK-
FURTER AND HIS TIMES: THE REFORM YEARS 74 (1982) (“[Frankfurter] did not endorse 
government by the judiciary . . . .”). 
75 319 U.S. 624 (1943).  
76 Id. at 642. 
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when reaching a decision.77 The furthest a judge ought to go, Justice 
Frankfurter stressed, is to consider “whether legislators could in reason have 
enacted such a law.”78 Anything more, he said, “prevent[s] the full play of 
the democratic process.”79 Even where a provision of the Bill of Rights is 
involved, Justice Frankfurter argued, the Court ought not to arrogate any 
“greater veto power.”80 To consider the courts to be the “primary protector” 
of any right is improper, as legislatures “are ultimate guardians of the 
liberties . . . in quite as great a degree as the courts.”81 
There are other, more modern arguments for mandatory minimalism 
that focus on its practical virtues. For instance, with respect to wartime 
rulings, Professor Sunstein has argued that courts should issue “narrow, 
incompletely theorized” rulings as to executive war powers.82 This practice, 
he says, “avoid[s] excessive intrusions into the executive domain.”83 
Moreover, it errs on the side of nonintervention in a situation where a court 
invariably has incomplete knowledge.84 In other words, a court should defer 
to the other branches when, as a practical matter, the court is not well 
situated to decide the question before it.  
B. Foot-in-the-Door Minimalism 
Minimalism can also be viewed as a strategic decision and not a mandate. 
After convincingly demonstrating that Heller was an example of judicial 
minimalism,85 Professor Sunstein notes that the Heller holding may have 
 
77 Id. at 647 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
78 Id. (emphasis added). 
79 Id. at 650; see also Thayer, supra note 62, at 144 (“[H]aving regard to the great, complex, 
ever-unfolding exigencies of government, much which will seem unconstitutional to one man, or 
body of men, may reasonably not seem so to another; that the constitution often admits of 
different interpretations; that there is often a range of choice and judgment; that in such cases the 
constitution does not impose upon the legislature any one specific opinion, but leaves open this 
range of choice; and that whatever choice is rational is constitutional.”). 
80 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 648-49 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). But see United States v. Carolene 
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“There may be narrower scope for operation of the 
presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific 
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments . . . .”). 
81 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 648-49 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. 
Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904) (Holmes, J.)). 
82 Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 103, 108. 
83 Id. The same practice also avoids “setting precedents that will, in retrospect,” give the 
President too much power. Id. 
84 Id. at 76-77. 
85 See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text. Here it is worth noting that “minimalism” 
can mean several things. For example, the minimalism I attribute to Justice Frankfurter, supra 
notes 74-81 and accompanying text, prescribes deference to the legislative will, while the 
“minimalism” Sunstein ascribes to Heller and Griswold is characterized by effecting doctrinal shifts 
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been a deliberately small step intended to serve as a “starting point for 
doctrinal innovation.”86 Let us call this foot-in-the-door minimalism. Sunstein 
suggests two reasons why the Court might begin a long judicial journey 
with a single, fairly small step:  
One reason is sensible litigation strategy; if the goal is to convince the 
Court to embark on a new path, the best strategy is usually to find an out-
lier and ask the Court to invalidate it in a way that leaves a door for future 
expansion. And if the Court itself is initiating a new avenue for potential 
invalidations, it is likely to begin narrowly and in a way that does not fit 
badly with public convictions . . . .87 
Sunstein suggests that Heller could be an example of this kind of mini-
malism.88 If it is, then his comparison to Griswold holds up well. Griswold 
held narrowly that the Connecticut prohibition on the use of contraception 
irreconcilably conflicted with “the notions of privacy surrounding the 
marriage relationship.”89 The Court did not address the constitutionality of 
banning the purchase or sale of contraception, nor of the right of unmarried 
persons to use it.90 Nevertheless, in subsequent holdings, the Court expand-
ed the right to privacy to protect a growing sphere of activity from state 
regulation.91 
It is far from certain, however, that the Heller Court was employing 
foot-in-the-door minimalism. The evidence points both ways. The Supreme 
Court signaled in Heller that it would revisit this nascent area of Second 
 
but on narrow grounds. There is, of course, an analytic distinction to be drawn. Nevertheless, for 
the purposes of this Comment, I allow both judicial approaches to fall under an umbrella of 
“minimalism.” Both can be contrasted to a more active judicial role that might, say, invalidate 
legislative action with broad, sweeping rulings that make demanding requirements of the states or 
the federal political branches. See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 51, at 289 (offering Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113 (1973), as an example of a holding that was “uncommonly aggressive” and “establish[ed] a 
framework far beyond the issues presented” in the case). 
86 Sunstein, supra note 11, at 264. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (emphasis added). 
90 Sunstein, supra note 11, at 267. 
91 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (broadening the right to privacy to include the 
right to procure an abortion, subject to certain permissible state limitations); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (establishing the right of unmarried persons to use contraceptive devices 
and stating that “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married 
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally 
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child”). 
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Amendment law.92 Indeed, McDonald itself represents an expansion of the 
doctrine.93 On the other hand, one commentator has argued that Heller’s 
reasoning is particularly resistant to future expansion.94 On that view, 
proscribing total gun bans while overtly protecting many other prohibitions 
(with a list that “d[id] not purport to be exhaustive”95) laid down a bright-
line rule and “mov[ed] other dominoes away from the edge of the table.”96 
In any event, the presence of foot-in-the-door minimalism is a question of 
intent—a ruling that permits judicial expansion is not necessarily written 
with that objective in mind.97 Without more input from the Court, it is 
simply too early to tell whether Heller is an instance of foot-in-the-door 
minimalism. 
C. Power-Preserving Minimalism 
There is a third factor that has, at times, motivated the Court to employ 
minimalism: its desire to preserve judicial supremacy98 over constitutional 
interpretation. I call this approach power-preserving minimalism. Preserving 
judicial power may sound like gilding the lily, for the Court’s role as the 
“ultimate expositor of the constitutional text”99 already enjoys widespread 
acceptance.100 But ‘twas not ever thus: judicial supremacy is a product of 
history.101 
 
92 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (“[S]ince this case represents 
this Court’s first in-depth examination of the Second Amendment, one should not expect it to 
clarify the entire field . . . .”). 
93 Cf. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 268 (demonstrating Heller’s narrowness by noting that the 
Court left open certain questions, including whether the Second Amendment was applicable to the 
states). 
94 See Dennis A. Henigan, The Heller Paradox, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1171, 1195-1200 (2009) 
(calling the Heller decision a “less-than-potent legal weapon against other gun laws”). 
95 Id. at 1195 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26). 
96 Id. at 1196. 
97 Moreover, individual Justices within the majority may have conceptualized the opinion 
differently. Cf. Philippa Strum, Change and Continuity on the Supreme Court: Conversations with 
Justice Harry A. Blackmun, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 285, 288 (2000) (relating that the need for five 
votes means that many Supreme Court opinions “are the result of compromise” (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
98 “Judicial supremacy” is something of a term of art, but for present purposes it may be 
understood as the state of affairs wherein the Court’s pronouncements as to the meaning of the 
Constitution in any given case are binding not only on the parties to the litigation, but on 
everyone, inside and outside the government, unless or until there is a doctrinal change or 
constitutional amendment. 
99 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000). 
100 See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITU-
TIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 228-33 (2004) (“The acceptance of judicial authority is most 
apparent . . . in the all-but-complete disappearance of public challenges to the Justices’ supremacy 
  
638 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 161: 623 
 
Structurally, of course, there is very little reason for the Court to 
command as much influence as it does today. The Constitution does not 
mandate judicial review or judicial supremacy,102 and the Court has no army 
with which to impose its will. Indeed, as Alexander Hamilton said, the 
Judiciary is the only branch of government that has “neither FORCE nor 
WILL but merely judgment.”103 It “ultimately depend[s] upon the aid of 
the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.”104 Judicial 
supremacy, then, is entirely the result of—and dependent upon—the 
coordinate branches’ compliance with judicial decisions.  
Today, we take that compliance for granted, but it is not inconceivable 
that a President would decline to enforce the will of the Court.105 A 
President may pay a price at the polls if she ignores the high court, but that 
 
over constitutional law.”); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 27 (2007) (“[J]udicial supremacy has grown and become more 
secure over time.”).  
101 See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 100, at 45. Beyond empirical truths about the presence or 
absence of judicial supremacy in our national government, the normative value of judicial 
supremacy is actively debated. See generally Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial 
Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997) (defending judicial supremacy on the 
grounds that it provides a crucial settling function in the law); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford 
Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From Partisan Entrenchment to the National 
Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 489-502 (2006) (arguing that, in the long run, the 
process of judicial nominations keeps the Court in line with dominant political views); Jeremy 
Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006) (arguing that 
judicial supremacy is problematic in that it subverts the democratic will of the people). 
102 See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT 
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 1 (1962) (“[T]his power of judicial review, as it is called, does not 
derive from any explicit constitutional command.”); Stephen Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work: 
The Yale Lectures, 120 YALE L.J. 1999, 2000 (2011) (explaining that Americans follow the Supreme 
Court’s rulings as a result of “history . . . judicial and public practices . . . the development of 
customs and understandings among the public”); see also U.S. CONST. art. III. 
103 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 464 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). 
104 Id.; see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say 
What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 278-84 (1994) (arguing that judicial supremacy exists mainly at 
the sufferance of acquiescent executives, whose historical tolerance of such supremacy may not 
have been intended by the Founders). The Court’s basic dependence on the political branches may 
prevent it from requiring those branches to adhere to overly restrictive readings of vague 
constitutional commands. This may help explain the Court’s “lenient scrutiny for laws having only 
disparate impacts on minorities” even though such lenience is “hardly [an] inevitable reading[] of 
the U.S. Constitution.” William N. Eskridge, Jr., America’s Statutory “Constitution,” 41 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1, 32 (2007) (citation omitted). 
105 Cf. Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 50 n.43 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting 
as to jurisdiction) (“Under the Constitution, the President may decline to enforce a statute that 
regulates private individuals when the President deems the statute unconstitutional, even if a court 
has held or would hold the statute constitutional.” (emphasis added)), abrogated by Nat’l Fed’n of 
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012).  
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force is mere political reality, not constitutional necessity.106 So in that 
sense, the Court is beholden to the people, too.107 Its credibility and its 
power come from the fact the people, as a matter of fact, trust the Court, do 
what it says, and elect presidents who enforce that norm.108  
Once we accept the proposition that judicial supremacy is tentative, we 
should acknowledge that when the Court perceives a particular case as 
threatening its influence,109 it may choose to decide a case with a deliberate 
eye toward preserving its own power. In some of those cases, the Court will 
choose minimalism as the appropriate judicial tool to give effect to this 
desire.110 In my view, this approach is necessary when (1) the case addresses 
 
106 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 100, at 26-27 (arguing that judicial supremacy is sustain-
able for as long as “[t]he president . . . see[s] some political value in deferring to the Court”). 
107 See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 
370, 375 (2009) (“Judicial power exists at popular dispensation. . . . [W]hen judicial decisions 
wander far from what the public will tolerate, bad things happen to the Court and the justices.”); 
Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 2602 (2003) 
(“[C]onsistent with the concept of popular constitutionalism, the judicial veto necessarily must fall 
within a range acceptable to popular judgment over time. . . . The question is whether on 
reflection a judicial decision will win popular acceptance.”). Or, more pithily, “[t]he court likes to 
pretend it’s completely above public opinion, inured to the momentary zigs and zags of the polls. 
But most of us know that nothing could be further from the truth.” Dahlia Lithwick, It’s Not About 
the Law, Stupid, SLATE (Mar. 22, 2012, 7:58 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/ 
jurisprudence/2012/03/the_supreme_court_is_more_concerned_with_the_politics_of_the_health_care_ 
debate_than_the_law_.single.html. 
108 Cf. Breyer, supra note 102, at 2009 (characterizing the Court’s civil rights–era statements 
that Southern schools were obligated to desegregate, even in “instances that were not the direct 
subject of litigation . . . [as] an appeal to law-abiding citizens to follow Brown’s law voluntarily” 
(emphasis added)). 
109 At the extreme, the risk may be one of actual defiance, but it need not be. It is possible 
for the general public to comply with a Supreme Court decision, yet lose faith in the Court—an 
outcome which is itself undesirable. Bush v. Gore is an oft-cited example of this phenomenon. 
Critics of the decision not only disagreed on the law but “went after the justices’ motives and their 
integrity.” JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME 
COURT 181 (2007); see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is 
confidence in the men and women who administer the judicial system that is the true backbone of 
the rule of law. Time will one day heal the wound to that confidence that will be inflicted by 
today’s decision.”). But “despite the strong opposition to the decision . . . Americans did not riot 
in the streets, they did not resort to violence, they reacted peacefully and then followed the 
Court.” Breyer, supra note 102, at 2011. That rioting did not break out following Bush, and that 
many Americans accepted an outcome with which they disagreed, is perhaps empirical support for 
Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer’s position on judicial supremacy—that “there are virtues 
in settlement for settlement’s sake.” Alexander & Schauer, supra note 101, at 1385. 
110 This is certainly not the only approach available to courts facing possible noncompliance. 
A court can call attention to defiance in order to highlight what it sees as a dangerous power 
imbalance. In 1861, in Ex parte Merryman, Chief Justice Roger Taney (sitting as a circuit judge) 
ruled that President Lincoln did not have the authority to suspend habeas corpus even though he 
knew that Lincoln would not comply. 17 F. Cas. 144, 152-53 (Taney, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Md. 
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an issue of broad and intense public concern; (2) public opinion is divided 
(or, worse, squarely on the losing side); and (3) the Court feels legally 
compelled to rule against the state.111 Cases, in short, like Heller.112 The 
hallmarks of power-preserving minimalism are narrow (even if innovative) 
legal reasoning and, where applicable, minimally demanding remedies. Such 
outcomes delegate the specifics of effectuating a ruling to political, non-
judicial actors. 
Delegating control over the remedy serves a dual purpose. First, it 
placates those opposed to the decision by giving them some (political) 
control over its manifestation. At the same time, delegation presupposes, 
and thus preserves, power. One cannot delegate a power that one does not 
have. Thus, the Court maintains its authority by declining in that instance 
to use all of it. 
Power-preserving minimalism is not inconsistent with foot-in-the-door 
minimalism.113 It is, however, a subtle expansion on that notion. Foot-in-
the-door minimalism holds that small doctrinal disruptions in a given area 
 
1861) (No. 9,487). Rather than try to fashion a minimal remedy and preserve some semblance of 
power, Taney acknowledged the conflict openly: “I have exercised all the power which the 
constitution and laws confer upon me, but that power has been resisted by a force too strong for 
me to overcome.” Id.  
The Court has also avoided substantively divisive issues by appealing to procedural or pru-
dential doctrines. See Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 108-12 
(2007) (noting that the Court’s justiciability doctrine provides “a mechanism by which to avoid 
awkward cases”). In Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, for example, the Court was asked 
to decide whether Congress’ addition of “under God” to the Pledge of Allegiance violated the 
Establishment Clause. 542 U.S. 1, 5 (2004). Declining to reach the merits of the dispute, the 
Court ruled that Newdow, the plaintiff below, lacked standing to sue. Id. at 17-18. Commentators 
and some concurring justices argued that the Court’s standing rationale was weak and was crafted 
specifically to avoid deciding the thorny First Amendment issue. See, e.g., id. at 18 (Rehnquist, 
C.J., concurring in the judgment) (“The Court today erects a novel prudential standing principle 
in order to avoid reaching the merits of the constitutional claim.”); Douglas Laycock, Theology 
Scholarships, The Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the 
Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 224 (2004) (“In Newdow, it may have been politically impossible 
to affirm and legally impossible to reverse.”); Siegel, supra, at 111 (“[T]he Court managed to dump 
the case only by bringing in considerations never before mentioned in standing decisions. . . . [I]n 
its efforts to rid itself of one awkward case, the Court . . . made bad standing law . . . .”). 
111 Of course, when the Court rules for the state, the compliance challenge drops away as a 
practical matter. Ruling for the state affirms its right to do whatever it is already doing. As this 
factor reaffirms, power-preserving minimalism counsels narrow rulings and minimally demanding 
remedies once certain legal decisions have already been made. It ought not to—and I do not 
believe it does—affect the Court’s resolution of discrete legal issues. 
112 As mentioned, supra note 24, another example is the Court’s recent decision on the consti-
tutionality of the Affordable Care Act. 
113 For instance, I argue in Part III that the holding in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 
483 (1954), was an example of power-preserving minimalism. For the suggestion that Brown was 
an example of foot-in-the-door minimalism, see Sunstein, supra note 11, at 262-63, 266-67. 
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of the law (such as privacy or the Second Amendment) can create an 
opportunity for the Court to evolve that doctrine more significantly over 
time and with more decisions.114 This idea is itself innovative. The Court, in 
order to maximize its impact, must perhaps minimize its initial splash.115 
 I do not disagree. As with foot-in-the-door minimalism, power-
preserving minimalism suggests that maximal eventual impact can at times 
require a delicate initial touch. But power-preserving minimalism goes a 
step further by suggesting that the effect of minimalism is not necessarily 
localized to any particular doctrine.116 Rather, maintenance of the Court’s 
maximal authority “to say what the law is”117—what any part of the law is—
depends on its judicious deployment of minimalism.118 Thus, while foot-in-
the-door minimalism is concerned with the particular doctrine before the 
Court, power-preserving minimalism is concerned with the Court’s role in 
our constitutional system.  
III. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF POWER-PRESERVING 
 MINIMALISM: MARBURY AND BROWN 
Below I argue that Heller and McDonald are examples of power-
preserving minimalism. First, however, it is worthwhile to identify other 
instances of this kind of minimalism in the Court’s history, lest the theory 
seem fitted to two cases, post hoc.119 The examples also allow us to analyze 
the tactic in greater depth.  
One example is Marbury v. Madison.120 William Marbury had been 
appointed justice of the peace by the outgoing President Adams, but had 
then been denied his commission by newly elected President Jefferson’s 
Secretary of State, James Madison.121 Marbury petitioned the Supreme 
 
114 See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 264 (“Minimalism . . . is a common starting point for doc-
trinal innovation.”). 
115 See id. (arguing that “new [doctrinal] departure[s]” must be “drawn in narrow terms that 
fit well with public convictions”). 
116 For this point I am indebted to Professor Sophia Z. Lee. 
117 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
118 Cf. Michiko Kakutani, 9 Justices Who Sit in the Eye of Storms, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2012, at 
C1 (reviewing JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE OATH: THE OBAMA WHITE HOUSE AND THE 
SUPREME COURT (2012)) (crediting Mr. Toobin and other Court observers with the view that, 
in upholding the Affordable Care Act, “the chief justice was actually playing the long game” and 
preserving the court’s power for future cases). 
119 At worst, the theory is fitted to four cases, post hoc. 
120 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137. For a discussion of how Marbury and other decisions throughout 
the Court’s history have helped to shape the Court’s role and solidify its credibility among the 
American people, see Breyer, supra note 102, at 2000-03. 
121 Breyer, supra note 102, at 2001-02. 
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Court for a writ of mandamus directing Madison to deliver the com-
mission.122 The case presented an early challenge to the Court’s power: 
clearly the President or his surrogate, Madison, was legally obligated to 
deliver the commission,123 but, as Chief Justice Marshall knew, if the Court 
ruled as much, Jefferson would not comply.124  
Enter power-preserving minimalism—or, in Justice Breyer’s words, 
“Chief Houdini Marshall.”125 The Court determined that Jefferson was 
obligated to deliver the commission,126 but it declined to order him to do so. 
Holding that the Judiciary Act of 1789, which had provided Marbury with 
jurisdiction to sue, was unconstitutional under Article III, the Court 
dismissed the petition.127 Compliance was guaranteed: “Jefferson could not 
defy the Court, for he had won.”128 Yet, in the background, the Court had 
(1) asserted the awesome power to invalidate acts of Congress it deemed 
unconstitutional, and (2) reached the legal conclusion it felt obligated to 
reach.129 Marbury displays the qualities of power-preserving minimalism 
discussed in Part II. The Court was compelled to rule against Marbury (and 
Jefferson, the Executive), but it did so without requiring any action. As a 
result, Jefferson could not defy the Court and thus could not deplete its 
power. 
Another example is Brown v. Board of Education.130 Brown, of course, was 
the 1954 case that challenged many states’ practice of segregating schools on 
the basis of race.131 Ultimately, the Justices declared that segregating schools 
on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause132 and charged the 
states with ending the practice “with all deliberate speed.”133  
That decision was not reached without due consideration of the Court’s 
ability to compel action. In deciding Brown, the Court was aware of the 
 
122 Id. at 2002. 
123 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 162. 
124 Breyer, supra note 102, at 2003. 
125 Id. 
126 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 168. 
127 Id. at 175-80. 
128 Breyer, supra note 102, at 2003. 
129 Id. Discussions of Marbury frequently border on the obsequious, see, e.g., BICKEL, supra 
note 102, at 1 (crediting Chief Justice Marshall with having “summoned [the judiciary] up out of 
the constitutional vapors”), but it has not escaped criticism. See, e.g., JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE 
CHIEFS: A SUPREME COURT MEMOIR 17 (2011) (“I have never found satisfying Marshall’s 
explication of why the statute was unconstitutional.”). 
130 Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 
(1955). 
131 Brown I, 347 U.S. at 487-88. 
132 Id. at 495. 
133 Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301. 
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“perceived importance of avoiding unenforceable orders.”134 For although 
the public as a whole supported desegregation,135 it was disfavored in the 
South by a ratio of four to one.136 And the South, of course, was where 
segregation was most entrenched and where a judicial decree would have to 
do the most work.137 In a memorandum written to the Conference before 
the Court issued its decision, Justice Jackson expressed doubt that declaring 
segregation unconstitutional would be “self-executing,” and he feared that 
an ignored mandate could bring “the judicial process into discredit.”138 Any 
declaration invalidating segregation, he wrote, should allow for gradual 
progress, for “it would retard acceptance of this decision” for the Court to 
promulgate “a needlessly ruthless decree.”139 The legal issue was compara-
tively simple. Although the Court’s ultimate reasoning has been criti-
cized,140 its conclusion that segregation was unconstitutional was 
undoubtedly correct.141  
Given the constraints it faced, the Court took a minimalist tack. It “an-
nounced its principle,”142 and then, a year later, issued a vague remedy 
which required little immediate action and delegated to the states the power 
to determine the proper pace and method of desegregation.143 This judicial 
 
134 MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 80 (2007). 
135 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 107, at 245 (noting that polls indicated that slightly more than 
half of the country agreed with the Brown decision at the time). 
136 See Timeline of Polling History: Events That Shaped the United States, and the World, GALLUP, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/9967/Timeline-Polling-History-Events-Shaped-United-States-World.aspx 
(last visited Nov. 16, 2011) (providing poll data from 1955 indicating that “72% in [the] East 
favor[ed] desegregation, 61% in the Midwest, 77% in the West, 20% in the South” (emphasis 
added)). 
137 Cf. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? 90 (2d ed. 2008) (“Southern judges were in a difficult position. . . . [T]he 
federal [judges] in the Southern states were required to dismantle a social system they had grown 
up with . . . .”). 
138 Memorandum by Mr. Justice Jackson to the Conference 12-13 (Mar. 15, 1954) [hereinafter 
Jackson Memo] (copy on file with author). 
139 Id. at 4. 
140 See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in 
Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1484-89 & n.49 (2004) (cataloguing 
grounds on which the Court’s reasoning has been criticized). 
141 See STEVENS, supra note 129, at 99 (calling the decision “dead right”). Disagreements 
about the treatment of race in the law persist, but everyone marshals Brown as support for their 
side of the debate. Compare Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701, 743 (2007) (plurality opinion) (citing Brown as support for the Court’s invalidation of a school 
integration program), with id. at 804 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (pointing to precedent in which 
Brown was read to require race-conscious integration programs). 
142 BICKEL, supra note 102, at 254. 
143 See Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955) (permitting courts to “find that additional time 
is necessary to carry out the ruling” and listing several acceptable justifications for the delay). 
  
644 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 161: 623 
 
delegation blunted the risk of defiance. It showed restraint by refusing to 
prescribe a “constructive policy”144 but allowed the Court to remain in 
(apparent) control, since even modest progress had the Court’s imprimatur. 
For all of its strategy, Brown encountered massive resistance. “Virtually 
nothing happened next.”145 One governor brazenly announced that segrega-
tion would continue in his state, while many other states engaged in so-
called “token integration”—admitting just a few black students across entire 
school districts.146 However, this cold reception could have been much more 
damaging in terms of power preservation had the Court issued a more 
demanding remedy.147  
Overly prescriptive remedies are problematic because, insofar as com-
pliance gets harder, defiance gets easier. And defiance, recall, is the biggest 
threat to judicial supremacy. Roe v. Wade illustrates the danger of issuing 
too broad a ruling. In Roe, the Court invalidated a Texas law banning 
abortions and, in doing so, established a specific, trimester-based framework 
against which all abortion laws were to be measured.148 The result was to 
declare invalid abortion laws across the country, and many states resisted.149 
Because Roe was so specific, to resist the decision at all was to defy the 
Court. Brown, on the other hand, was much more vague. Any desegregation 
that followed the decision had the Court’s backing (for better or worse), 
which allowed the Court to remain ostensibly in control and led to modest 
progress. For example, token integration, as small a step as it was, took 
political courage on the part of Southern moderate school board members—
 
144 Jackson Memo, supra note 138, at 13. 
145 Breyer, supra note 102, at 2006. 
146 KLARMAN, supra note 134, at 95-101. 
147 For the view that a more expedient, more demanding decree would have actually been 
more effective (notwithstanding power-preservation concerns), see STEVENS, supra note 129, at 
99-101. Cf. KLARMAN, supra note 134, at 100-01 (suggesting that by putting its imprimatur on 
gradual desegregation, the Court gave cover to Southern resistance, rather than forcing them to 
choose between integration and open—and potentially politically costly—defiance). 
148 410 U.S. 113, 153, 162-65 (1973). 
149 Cf. Jason A. Adkins, Note, Meet Me at the (West Coast) Hotel: The Lochner Era and the 
Demise of Roe v. Wade, 90 MINN. L. REV. 500, 516 (2005) (noting that, for two decades following 
Roe, state abortion laws continued to be challenged and overturned). Resistance to Roe has hardly 
abated. See generally, e.g., Monica Davey, South Dakota to Revisit Restrictions on Abortion, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 26, 2008, at A14 (reporting that four states have “trigger laws” which would ban 
abortion immediately upon Roe’s reversal); Erik Eckholm, Voters in Mississippi to Weigh Amendment 
on Conception as the Start of Life, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2011, at A16 (describing proposed state 
“personhood” amendments); B.A. Robinson, Major U.S. Laws Concerning Abortion, RELIGIOUS-
TOLERANCE.ORG, http://www.religioustolerance.org/abo_supr.htm (last updated Jan. 31, 2008) 
(“At least 16 states still have pre-1973 anti-abortion laws on the books even though they are clearly 
unconstitutional . . . . ”).  
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courage surely heartened by the Court’s mandate.150 Declaring token 
integration unconstitutional would have withdrawn that political cover and, 
therefore, could have backfired.151 Sanctioning minor progress enlarged the 
group of people considered to be furthering Brown’s mandate. 
The difference is not purely cosmetic. The public’s perception of the 
opinion affects the public’s perception of the Court, which in turn affects the 
Court’s power.152 Roe’s inflexible framework stole focus from the general 
constitutional issue; defiance was too easy.153 Brown, on the other hand, 
decided very little aside from the constitutional question. True defiance was 
difficult except for those taking the uncompromising position that the 
Constitution permits segregated schools.154  
Finally, and precisely because it left so much undecided, the Brown 
Court reserved for itself additional political capital to reinforce its under-
standing of equal protection as resistance to the decision eroded. Roe left no 
such room.155 As Professor Sunstein has observed, it is “relevant to the 
evaluation of Brown that the Court did not impose its principle all at once, 
and that it allowed room for other branches to discuss the mandate and to 
adapt themselves to it.”156  
When the political tide started to turn, the Court, having initially asked 
for so little, possessed unused reserves. After President Kennedy took office 
and bemoaned the “painfully” slow pace of integration,157 the emboldened 
Court struck down a Virginia segregation scheme, declaring that “[t]here 
 
150 See KLARMAN, supra note 134, at 98 (explaining that politicians who advocated integration 
in the South put themselves in “risky positions”). 
151 See id. at 95-100 (explaining that political pressures necessitated “gradualism” in integration).  
152 See supra Section II.C.  
153 As a result, the opinion has drawn criticism from all sides of the political spectrum. See, 
e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1198 (1992) 
(“Doctrinal limbs too swiftly shaped, experience teaches, may prove unstable. The most promi-
nent example in recent decades is Roe v. Wade.” (footnote omitted)); Wilkinson, supra note 51, at 
289-93 (arguing that the Court in Roe usurped the legislative role). 
154 Brown is certainly susceptible to the critique that its lax remedial decree allowed segrega-
tion to linger longer than it otherwise might have. See supra note 147. But from a compliance 
perspective, asking too little is less risky than asking too much. 
155 Roe’s rigidity (and perhaps the Court’s rightward shift) may explain why the decision has 
been continually cabined in later abortion cases. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007) 
(upholding the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 876-78 (1992) (discarding Roe’s trimester framework in favor of an “undue burden” 
standard that could permit interference with the right to have an abortion before viability). 
156 Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 51 (1996); see 
also BICKEL, supra note 102, at 254 (arguing that the Court set a low bar and provided a rebuke 
“only when a suggested expedient amounted to the abandonment of principle”). 
157 KLARMAN, supra note 134, at 101; see also id. (chronicling the political change that permit-
ted the pace of desegregation to accelerate). 
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has been entirely too much deliberation and not enough speed in enforc-
ing . . . Brown.”158 The Court had left itself room to fortify its mandate 
over time, while insulating itself from power-draining defiance. Although 
this tactic resembles foot-in-the-door minimalism from a distance, it is 
distinguishable when analyzed in terms of its motivation. On my view, the 
Court’s willingness to reinforce Brown with stronger language stemmed 
from its determination that such forcefulness would effectuate the central 
holding of Brown without harming the Court’s influence. On a foot-in-the-
door account, the Court’s motivation would be to expand Brown doctrinally 
and make new law. 
IV. HELLER AS BROWN 
Professor Sunstein is correct to connect Heller to Griswold in light of the 
minimalist qualities they share. However, Heller may also be compared to 
Brown with respect to the factors that motivated that minimalist approach. 
Forced to make a controversial decision on a topic of public interest, the 
Heller and McDonald Courts, like the Brown Court, pronounced a new legal 
principle and demanded very little else. They did this in the service of 
preserving their status as supreme constitutional interpreters. I argue above 
that power-preserving minimalism is most appropriate when a case is 
important to the public, public opinion is divided, and the Court feels 
compelled to rule against the state. All three factors were present in Heller 
and McDonald. 
As in Brown, compliance with a sweeping mandate would have been 
difficult because gun control is an issue of public importance. The federal 
 
158 Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 229 (1964); see also Goss v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 
683, 689 (1963) (recounting its mandate that integration be achieved with “all deliberate speed” 
but noting that “eight years after this decree was rendered . . . the context in which we must 
interpret and apply this language to plans for desegregation has been significantly altered”).  
The eventual widespread acceptance of Brown required shifts in politics and public opinion, as 
well as increasingly forceful Supreme Court opinions. Brown probably served as an impetus for 
some of those shifts, but public acceptance also permitted bolder rulings. See supra note 145. The 
questions of causation in this situation are extremely complicated and beyond the scope of this 
Comment. Scholars dispute whether the Supreme Court shapes public opinion or is merely 
shaped by it. Compare FRIEDMAN, supra note 107, at 370 (arguing that, as a practical matter, the 
Court is bound to public sentiments), and ROSENBERG, supra note 137, at 108 (cautioning that 
just because segregation ended after Brown does not mean it ended because of Brown), with Richard 
Primus, Public Consensus as Constitutional Authority, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1207, 1216 (2010) 
(“[I]f the Court moves the law three steps to the left and the political reaction leads the 
Court . . . two steps back to the right, the world is not quite as it was before the Court first 
intervened.”). 
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government enacted its first major gun control law in 1934,159 and the states 
have been regulating gun ownership since well before then.160 Currently, 
every state in the Union regulates gun ownership to some extent,161 and 
most of those regulations are more stringent than existing federal law.162 A 
sweeping ruling—for instance, that the Second Amendment requires any 
gun control law to satisfy “strict scrutiny”—could have invalidated dozens 
of gun control laws and, like Roe, would have starkly contrasted with the 
Court’s typical caution and gradualism in big cases. And had they gone that 
route, any resistance163 would have given the impression of a weak Court.164  
This risk was particularly palpable for the McDonald Court. First, an 
incorporation ruling affects fifty governments while a ruling interpreting 
federal law applies to just two. Second, forty-two states already “ha[d] 
constitutional provisions guaranteeing an individual right to bear arms,” and 
the courts in all of those states reviewed gun regulations under a “reasonable-
ness” standard.165 To demand strict scrutiny would have been either to 
declare that the federal Constitution protects a different right than forty-
two similarly worded documents, or to imply that forty-two state judiciaries 
had erred. 
Moreover, public opinion was divided. As Professor Sunstein notes, a 
majority of the national population supported an individual right.166 
However, Brown demonstrates that consensus at the highest level of 
generality is not the only relevant statistic.167 When it comes to rulings 
 
159 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 637 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
160 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3113 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(recounting the history of state and municipal firearms regulations). 
161 See ATF REPORT, supra note 1 (documenting various state gun ownership regulations). 
162 Brief for the States of Illinois, Maryland, and New Jersey as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 19-20, McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521), 2010 WL 
59029. 
163 It must be noted that mass invalidation of gun control laws would not require “implemen-
tation” in quite the same way as did Brown’s desegregation mandate. The invalidation would have 
been self-enforcing insofar as prosecutions under invalid laws would fail in any court. Neverthe-
less, as demonstrated by the backlash to Roe, resistance to a broad ruling can take forms short of 
literal defiance and can curtail or chill the public’s exercise of a right. 
164 Cf. Breyer, supra note 102, at 2006 (“Recognizing that compliance might take time, the 
Court held in Brown II that desegregation must proceed ‘with all deliberate speed.’” (citing Brown 
II, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955))). 
165 Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 711 (2007). 
166 See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 263. Heller was decided during the 2008 presidential cam-
paign, during which both major-party candidates, Barack Obama and John McCain, expressed 
support for the decision. Id. 
167 See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text. But cf. BICKEL, supra note 102, at 250 
(“[E]ven if the task of the Court were . . . to follow the election returns, surely the relevant 
returns would be those from the nation as a whole, not from a white majority in a given region.”). 
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affecting local laws, local politicians—not national focus groups—are 
ultimately charged with compliance. And key local politicians opposed 
limitations on their ability to regulate gun ownership as a means of promot-
ing public safety. The nonpartisan United States Conference of Mayors168 
wrote an amicus brief in McDonald opposing incorporation. They expressed 
concern that limiting states’ ability to regulate gun ownership “could 
become a critical obstacle to the cities’ efforts to combat violent crime.”169 
And New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s reaction to the decision 
conveyed a similar sentiment. He did not focus on the newly articulated 
right but instead emphasized how much power localities seemed to retain.170 
Finally, in both cases the Court felt legally compelled to rule against the 
laws being challenged and did so on the strength of a new constitutional 
rule. Whether one believes that Heller vindicated the original public 
meaning of the Second Amendment171 or effected an unjustified about-
face,172 the Court had never before held that the Second Amendment 
protects an individual right to bear arms.173 The innovation in McDonald 
was all the more explicit, because the Court had long before held, albeit on 
different grounds, that the Amendment did not restrain state governments.174  
That left only the question of the holding’s breadth. In Heller, the Court 
invalidated the D.C. handgun ban but went out of its way not to touch 
certain “longstanding prohibitions” on gun ownership.175 And in McDonald, 
the Court ruled solely that the Second Amendment was incorporated 
 
168 See About the U.S. Conference of Mayors, U.S. CONF. MAYORS, http://www.usmayors.org/ 
about/overview.asp (last visited Nov. 16, 2011). 
169 Brief of the United States Conference of Mayors as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respond-
ents at 21, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521), 2010 WL 59030. 
170 See Press Release, NYC.GOV, Statement of Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg on Decision by 
U.S. Supreme Court in McDonald v. Chicago (June 28, 2010), available at www.nyc.gov/html/ 
om/html/2010a/pr291-10.html (“[Heller and McDonald] make clear that we can work to keep guns 
out of the hands of criminals and terrorists while . . . respecting . . . the constitutional rights of 
law abiding citizens. That’s what New York City has always done.” (emphasis added)). 
171 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Opinion, News Flash: The Constitution Means What It Says, 
WALL ST. J., June 27, 2008, at A13 (praising Justice Scalia’s Heller opinion as “exemplary” and 
grounded in “extensive evidence of original meaning”). 
172 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 637-38 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that the Court in Heller abandoned its previous interpretation of the Second 
Amendment, from United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), which was “the most natural 
reading” of the text and the “most faithful to the history of its adoption”); Jack N. Rakove, The 
Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 103, 153-54 (2000) 
(providing “two major challenges to the individual right interpretation”). 
173 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 625 (calling the question of the meaning of the Second Amend-
ment “long judicially unresolved”). 
174 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. 
175 See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. 
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against the states and remanded the case for an examination of the chal-
lenged municipal laws. In neither case did the Court set a standard to steer 
lower courts in reviewing gun laws.176 As the dissents presaged,177 many 
lawsuits followed.178 But those challenges have not fared well in the lower 
courts.179  
Given the hot-button nature of the issue, the Court did well to rule nar-
rowly and hence make only minimal demands of citizens and the political 
branches. On a divisive issue, the more the Court had asked for, the more 
influence it would have had to leverage. Instead, the Court’s approach 
enunciated a principle and effectively delegated the responsibility for 
effecting and defining that principle to the democratic branches of the 
federal and state governments. It left those bodies in charge of gun policy 
while nonetheless preserving the power to review future rights violations. 
The Heller and McDonald decisions thus conformed to the power-preserving 
minimalist model. Like Marbury and Brown, both opinions were issued out 
of an awareness of the “perceived importance of avoiding unenforceable 
orders.”180 Justice Stevens’s concern that courts would engage in “case-by-
case judicial lawmaking to define the contours of acceptable gun-control”181 
has proven unfounded; those contours remain the purview of the democratic 
branches of government. 
To be sure, the Court’s lack of guidance leaves open the question of 
whether lower courts are giving proper effect to the Court’s rulings.182 It 
could be that the Supreme Court intended to delegate much of the job of 
interpreting the Second Amendment to the political branches, as seems to 
have happened, or it could be that lower courts are under-enforcing the 
Second Amendment to the Court’s chagrin (which could itself be power 
preservation by lower courts—applying the right rule while avoiding 
unenforceable holdings). However, there are good reasons to think that the 
 
176 See supra note 72 and accompanying text; see also Nina Totenberg, High Court Extends 
Gun Owners’ Rights Nationwide, NPR (June 28, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ 
story.php?storyId=128172317 (noting that the Court provided “little guidance” as to what types of 
gun regulations were permissible). 
177 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3115 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]oday’s decision invites an avalanche of litigation . . . .”); Heller, 554 U.S. at 680 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (predicting that the decision “will surely give rise to a far more active judicial role in 
making vitally important national policy decisions”). 
178 See supra note 69. 
179 See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text. 
180 KLARMAN, supra note 134, at 80. 
181 Heller, 554 U.S. at 680 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
182 Brown was an easier case in that respect: the Court explicitly countenanced gradual 
progress.  
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lower courts are applying the law correctly. First, a permissive rule aligns 
the federal Constitution with the forty-two state constitutions that already 
protect an individual right to bear arms.183 Second, even the narrow holding 
was a significant change in the law. The survival of most gun control legis-
lation did not dampen the victory for gun-rights advocates.184 In particular, 
the Bush Administration, which filed an amicus brief in Heller supporting 
the individual right, concurrently listed the prosecution of gun crimes as 
one of its top enforcement priorities.185 Consistent with that priority, the 
government’s brief proposed an even more cabined interpretation of the 
Second Amendment than the one the Court ultimately provided.186 In 
short, gun-rights advocates did not see Heller as a victory in name only.187 
CONCLUSION 
In 2011, Dick Heller—of Heller fame—lost his appeal before the D.C. 
Circuit.188 He had argued that D.C.’s emergency legislation, enacted in the 
wake of Heller I, as it might now be called, failed to cure the original con-
stitutional defect.189 Dissenting from the panel opinion, Judge Kavanaugh 
 
183 See supra note 165 and accompanying text; see also Heller, 554 U.S. at 691 (Breyer, J., dis-
senting) (pointing to state courts’ treatment of gun rights as “instructive”). 
184 Among gun-rights supporters, there is considerable variance from the view espoused in 
1975 by then–California Governor Ronald Reagan, who said that the Second Amendment “appears 
to leave little if any leeway for the gun control advocate.” Siegel, supra note 5, at 210 (citation 
omitted). 
185 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2008 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 
II-11 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/annualreports/pr2008/sect2/p38-63.pdf (listing 
and describing the ATF’s gun-control efforts). 
186 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 20-26, District of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 157201 (“Like Rights Conferred By Surrounding 
Provisions of the Bill of Rights, The Individual Right Guaranteed by the Second Amendment is 
Subject to Reasonable Restrictions and Important Exceptions”); Supreme Court Strikes Down Gun 
Ban, HERALD-TRIB. (Sarasota, Fla.) (June 26, 2008, 11:43 AM), http://www.heraldtribune.com/ 
article/20080626/BREAKING/627114967 (“The decision went further than even the Bush 
administration wanted, but probably leaves most firearms laws intact.”). The Obama Administra-
tion continues to advocate deference to democratically enacted gun-control laws. See Lyle 
Denniston, U.S.: Less Protection for Gun Rights, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 19, 2011, 7:24 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/10/u-s-less-protection-for-gun-rights (“[T]here was no reason to 
judge gun controls beyond the home by anything other than mid-level scrutiny . . . .” (citing Brief 
for the United States in Opposition, Masciandaro v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 756 (2011) (No. 10-
11212), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 756 (2011))). 
187 See, e.g., Totenberg, supra note 176 (“Reaction to the decision was predictable—elation 
from gun-rights organizations, and concerned caution from law enforcement and gun-control 
groups.” (emphasis added)); Supreme Court Strikes Down Gun Ban, supra note 186 (“Gun rights 
supporters hailed the decision.”). 
188 See Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (remanding the case to the district court). 
189 Id. at 1248-49. 
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wrote in twenty words what I hope I have conveyed in a few thousand: 
“Heller, while enormously significant jurisprudentially, was not revolutionary 
in terms of its immediate real-world effects on American gun regulation.”190 
In my view, that was precisely the point. The Court never intended to 
effect “a dramatic upheaval in the law”191—only to announce an important 
new rule and preserve its power. On that score, it appears to have succeeded. 
The Court made a strong legal statement in uncharted constitutional 
waters, and it did so narrowly. It commanded very little action and thus 
largely avoided the risk of defiance. 
If power-preserving minimalism was at play, it may not have been to the 
exclusion of other minimalist forces. Professor Sunstein has written—and 
Justice Frankfurter would likely agree—that “minimalism is the appropriate 
course for [adjudicating] large-scale moral or political issues” because it is 
“democracy-forcing.”192 This approach may have been particularly prudent 
with respect to gun control, since “the cultural contingency of the gun 
debate makes it a difficult dispute for the Court to ‘settle’ through con-
stitutional law.”193 In other words, right up to the discrete legal boundary 
set by the Court, Americans ought to decide what gun control laws are 
necessary through their elected representatives. On the other hand, the 
Court may have been wedging its figurative foot in the door, preparing its 
own effort to chip away at the legality of gun control. There is support for 
the argument that foot-in-the-door minimalism was not at play here,194 but 
it may be too early to say. In any event, given its historical and jurispru-
dential similarities to Brown and Marbury, Heller can be accurately catego-
rized as an instance of power-preserving minimalism.  
I am certainly not the first to suggest that the Court is concerned about 
its public perception.195 I have, however, tried to provide a framework that 
helps categorize the Court’s decisions in a way that accounts for their 
 
190 Id. at 1270 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). Judge Kavanaugh addressed only Heller, since the 
court’s review of a D.C. law required no analysis of McDonald’s incorporation holding. Neverthe-
less, I think the point applies equally well to both cases. 
191 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 639 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation 
omitted). 
192 Sunstein, supra note 156, at 50, 82. 
193 Denning, supra note 53, at 432 (writing after certiorari was granted but before the decision 
in Heller); see also Winkler, supra note 165, at 714-15 (arguing that striking the right balance 
between individual rights and gun control requires “highly complex socio-economic calculations” 
that legislatures are better suited than courts to make). 
194 See Lyle Denniston, Government Prayer Cases Passed Up, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www. 
scotusblog.com/2012/01/government-prayer-cases-passed-up (Jan. 17, 2012, 1:18 PM) (reporting that the 
Court consistently turns down opportunities “to spell out further how far the personal right to 
have a gun reaches”); see also supra notes 182-89 and accompanying text. 
195 See, e.g., supra note 107. 
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impact on the Court’s role and influence. That framework is a subtle 
expansion on Cass Sunstein’s observation that narrow decisions are “a 
common starting point for doctrinal innovation.”196 Narrow decisions are 
also sometimes key to the Court’s power over legal doctrine more generally. 
That the Court may need to take deliberate steps to preserve its influence 
should not be surprising in light of the foundations of judicial supremacy.197 
Without power, judgments are mere opinions without practical force. 
Understanding when power preservation is at play, and (perhaps more 
critically) when it is called for, matters because judicial supremacy is a 
“national treasure.”198  
By preserving its soft power in cases that permit that tactic, the Court 
retains the ability to exert a more forceful checking function on the other 
branches in cases unlike Heller—cases in which the luxury of minimalism is 
unavailable. These cases may include, as Justice Stone wrote in the famous 
Footnote Four, laws that affect “discrete and insular minorities,” the very 
enactment of which reflect a failure of the democratic process.199 Cases like 
these are, by hypothesis, countermajoritarian and thus stretch the Court’s 
power to require change. These cases present problems that cannot be 
solved through politics. When they arise, the Court’s ability to settle the 
law and enforce constitutional justice where no other branch can do so is 
crucial. And although we tend to take that power for granted, history 
teaches that preserving it is harder than it looks. 
 
 
196 Sunstein, supra note 11, at 264. 
197 See supra text accompanying notes 102-08. 
198 Breyer, supra note 102, at 2011. 
199 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). For an example of 
such a case, see Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229 (1985) (invalidating an Alabama state 
constitutional amendment which had the effect of limiting the voting rights of black citizens and 
the undisguised purpose of which was, in the words of the president of the state constitutional 
convention, “to establish white supremacy in th[e] State” (citation omitted)). It bears repeating 
that Brown, too, may have been one of these cases. See supra note 147. I have tried to offer a 
descriptive account of what motivated the Brown Court, but I do not address whether the path it 
chose was the most effective way to eradicate segregation. 
